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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, : Case No. 930204-CA 
v. : 
DENNIS RICHARD VIGH, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Respondent. : 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The issue presented in this petition for rehearing is 
whether the Court, in stating that "criminal histories are not 
properly part of probable cause determinations," State v. VicTh, 
Case No. 930204-CA, slip op. at 4 (Utah App. March 15, 1994), 
overlooked and misapplied relevant Utah case law recognizing that 
prior convictions may properly be included in a search warrant 
affidavit as corroborative of inculpatory information received 
from confidential sources, and/or as demonstrative of the 
suspects' involvement in related, protracted and continuous 
criminality. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
For purposes of this petition, this Court's statement 
of the case and facts is generally sufficient. See State v. 
Viqh, No. 930204-CA, slip op. at 1-3 (Utah App. March 15, 1994) 
(a copy of the opinion is attached as addendum A). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court's opinion incorrectly suggests that prior 
convictions are never properly part of the magistrate's probable 
cause determination. While the Court may legitimately determine 
that, under the totality of the circumstances, inclusion of 
defendant's 1986 drug related convictions did not contribute a 
great deal to the magistrate's determination that defendant was 
currently involved in drug trafficking, that conclusion does not 
warrant the Court's overbroad statement that prior convictions 
are never properly included in the magistrate's assessment of 
probable cause. Indeed, the Court's opinion misapplies and 
overlooks relevant Utah case law recognizing legitimate bases for 
including a suspect's prior criminal history in the search 
warrant affidavit. Specifically, a suspect's prior convictions 
are properly included in the search warrant affidavit to 
corroborate information from confidential sources implicating the 
suspect in related criminality. For example, a suspect's prior 
drug related convictions may .help to establish his/her 
involvement in a protracted and ongoing criminal scheme like drug 
trafficking. 
Accordingly, the Court should modify its opinion in 
this case to recognize that defendant's prior drug related 
convictions, though certainly not dispositive of the ultimate 
probable cause determination, were nonetheless properly included 
2 
in the search warrant affidavit as at least corroborative of the 
confidential informant's allegation of defendant's involvement in 
drug trafficking. 
INTRODUCTION 
A petition for rehearing is appropriate when the Court 
has either "misapplied or overlooked [law] which materially 
affects the result." See Cummins v. Nielsen, 42 Utah 157, 172-
73, 129 P. 619, 624 (1913). The argument portion of this brief 
will demonstrate that the State's petition for rehearing is 
properly before the Court and should be granted. 
ARGUMENT 
PRIOR CONVICTIONS MAY PROPERLY BE PART OF THE 
PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION FOR PURPOSES OF 
CORROBORATING INCULPATORY INFORMATION 
RECEIVED FROM CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS, AND 
ALSO ESTABLISHING THE SUSPECT'S INVOLVEMENT 
IN SIMILAR CRIMINAL ACTIVITY OF A PROTRACTED 
AND CONTINUOUS NATURE 
The State acknowledges that this Court affirmed 
defendant's second and third degree felony convictions for drug 
related offenses. See State v. Viah, No. 930204-CA, slip op. at 
1 (Utah App. March 15, 1994), see addendum A. In so doing this 
Court upheld the warrant supported search of defendant's mobile 
home on the ground that the search warrant affidavit set forth a 
substantial basis for the issuing magistrate's probable cause 
determination. Viah, No. 930204-CA, slip op. at 5, see addendum 
A. However, in assessing the totality of the facts upon which 
the magistrate relied, this Court excised information concerning 
3 
defendant's prior drug related convictions1 on the ground the 
information "may have been" improperly included. Vicrh, No. 
930204-CA, slip op. at 4-5, see addendum A. Although the Court 
ultimately and appropriately determined that the remaining 
information was sufficient to establish probable cause to search 
defendant's mobile home, id., see addendum A, the Court's 
treatment of defendant's prior convictions conflicts with 
relevant Utah case law. 
Relying on State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993), the Court prefaced its 
determination to excise defendant's prior convictions by 
reiterating its Brooks holding "that criminal histories are not 
properly part of probable cause determinations because such 
determinations center only on the likelihood that evidence of a 
crime will be found in a particular place." Vicrh, No. 930294-CA, 
slip op. at 4 (citing Brooks. 849 P.2d at 644). The foregoing 
sentence could reasonably lead the reader to believe that under 
no circumstance should prior convictions be included in the 
search warrant affidavit. Such a conclusion is contrary to 
relevant Utah case law recognizing the propriety of including a 
suspects' prior convictions in a search warrant affidavit. 
1
 Defendant was previously convicted in 1986 for 
arranging the sale of a controlled substance and attempted 
distribution of a controlled substance, both third degree 
felonies. See Br. of Appellee at 6-7. 
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A. State v. Brooks Is Clearly Erroneous and 
Should be Overruled 
For reasons set forth in its opening brief, the State 
originally asked the Court to confine Brooks to the unique facts 
of that case and not to read the opinion as precluding the use of 
prior convictions in future search warrant affidavits. Br. of 
Appellee at 22 (a copy is attached as addendum B). However, in 
the interim, the Utah Supreme Court clarified the doctrine of 
stare decisis, including horizontal stare decisis, which requires 
courts composed of multiple panels "to observe the prior 
decisions of another." State v. Menzies, No. 880161, slip op. at 
6 n.3 (Utah March 29, 1994). The supreme court explained that 
[h]orizontal stare decisis does not . . . 
require that a panel adhere to its own or 
another panel's prior decisions with the same 
inflexibility as does vertical stare decisis. 
Instead, although it may not do so lightly, a 
panel may overrule its own or another panel's 
decision where xthe decision is clearly 
erroneous or conditions have changed so as to 
render the prior decision inapplicable.' 
Id. (citations omitted). Further, because the decision to 
overrule prior precedent is never lightly taken, the supreme 
court set forth certain criteria indicating when erroneous 
precedent may appropriately be overruled. Those criteria include 
the failure to "acknowledge[] prior authority" and to provide 
meaningful ana: *?is and supporting authority. Id. at 7. For 
reasons set forth, infra, in the body of this petition, Brooks is 
a "clearly erroneous" opinion, which under the Menzies criteria, 
should be overruled. 
5 
For the first time in Brooks, this Court asserted that 
prior convictions are not properly part of the probable cause 
determination. 849 P.2d at 644.2 Specifically, the Court 
determined that information Brooks had a criminal history of drug 
related offenses contributed nothing to the establishment of 
probable cause to believe that he was involved in drug 
trafficking and was therefore "not properly part of the [probable 
cause determination]." Id. However, as set forth in the State's 
opening brief, Br. of Appellee at 18-22, see addendum B, the 
central issue in Brooks was not the propriety of including 
Brooks' criminal history in the affidavit, but whether the 
informant's controlled buys from Brooks, which were also set 
forth in the affidavit, provided a substantial basis for the 
magistrate's probable cause determination. 849 P.2d at 643-45. 
Consequently, neither the parties, nor the Court, focused on the 
criminal history issue raised here. This lack of focus is 
reflected in the Brooks opinion which neither reviews nor 
acknowledges contrary Utah case law recognizing that prior 
convictions are properly included in the probable cause 
determination for certain limited purposes. 
2
 The Court has since relied on Brooks in State v. 
Potter, 860 P.2d 952, 956 (Utah App. 1993), holding that 
infomation obtained from an informant that a convicted drug 
dealer was then inside Potter's trailer was not properly part of 
the probable cause determination for purposes of securing a 
search warrant for Potter's trailer. But Cf. State v. Bailey, 
675 P.2d 1203, 1204, 1206 (Utah 1984) (upholding search warrant 
affidavit in support of search warrant for suspected burglars' 
apartment where police verified one of the suspects "had an 
extensive record for burglary and auto theft"). 
€ 
Additionally, as set forth more fully in the State's 
opening brief, there are at least two legitimate reasons for 
including a suspects' prior convictions in the search warrant 
affidavit. Br. of Appellee at 18-22, see addendum B. For 
example, it is well established that a suspect's related prior 
criminal history is properly included in the search warrant 
affidavit as corroborative of inculpatory information gleaned 
from a confidential informant. See Jones v. United States, 362 
U.S. 257, 271 (1960) (Court upheld search warrant affidavit 
containing statement that Jones had previously admitted using 
narcotics on the ground that the information "made the charge 
against [Jones] much less subject to skepticism than would be 
such a charge against one without such a history"); Bailey, 675 
P.2d at 1204, 1206 (upholding affidavit based information 
obtained from a confidential information, noting that police had 
verified that one of the two burglary suspects "had an extensive 
record for burglary and auto theft"); State v. Strombera, 783 
P.2d 54, 55 (Utah App.) (noting defendant's prior conviction for 
unlawful possession corroborated informant's assertions of his 
involvement in an ongoing pattern of marijuana use), cert. 
denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990); State v. Buford, 820 P.2d 
1381, 1385 (Utah App. 1991) (finding affidavit adequately 
established informant reliability based, in part, on officers' 
verification of defendant's prior, drug related criminal record). 
See also State v. Lee, 863 P.2d 49, 56 (Utah App. 1993) 
(recognizing affiant officer's knowledge of illegal drug 
7 
possession suspect's "history of substance abuse and sales," 
helped to corroborate confidential informant's observations of 
same). 
A suspect's prior criminal history is also probative of 
his/her continuous involvement in a similar, protracted criminal 
enterprise. State v. Singleton, 854 P.2d 1017, 1021 (Utah App. 
1993) (affirmatively noting that the affidavit recited facts 
"indicating defendant was involved in continuous and ongoing 
criminal activity at defendant's residence[,]" including "a 
substantial history of controlled substance violations by 
defendant involving her residence"); Stromberg, 783 P.2d at 57 
(trial court's finding that the magistrate reasonably believed 
Stromberg was involved in "an ongoing pattern of marijuana use" 
was "supported by information that [Stromberg] had previously 
been convicted of a similar offense"). For example, as expressly 
acknowledged in Singleton, drug trafficking is widely recognized 
as a protracted and ongoing type of criminal activity, and 
Singleton's prior drug related convictions properly helped to 
establish her continuous involvement therein. 854 P.2d at 1021. 
See also United States v. Rowel1, 903 F.2d 899, 903 (2nd Cir. 
1990) ("x [n]arcotics conspiracies are the very paradigm of the 
continuing enterprises for which the courts have relaxed the 
temporal requirements of non-staleness'") (quoting United States 
v. Feola, 651 F.Supp. 1068, 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd mem., 875 
F.2d 857 (2nd Cir.), cert, denied, U.S. (1989)); United 
States v. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d 589, 597 (1st Cir. 1985) (drug 
8 
enterprise involving a network of suppliers, distributors, and 
customers is not created and then willingly dismantled the next 
day), vacated on other grounds, 476 U.S. 1138 (1986); United 
States v. Harris, 482 F.2d 1115, 1119 (3rd Cir. 1973) 
("[p]rotracted and continuous activity is inherent in a large-
scale narcotics operation"). 
Although the decision to overrule a prior panel 
decision is not lightly taken, applying the criteria set forth in 
Menzies, it is significant that Brooks "is not the most weighty 
of precedents." Menzies, No. 880161, slip op. at 7. 
Specifically, as noted previously, the opinion fails to explain 
its departure from well established Utah case law, outlined 
above, acknowledging the legitimate bases for including prior 
convictions in a search warrant affidavit. Id. Indeed, the 
opinion wholly fails to cite that line of authority. Id. 
Moreover, because neither party briefed the issue, it is likely 
the Brooks panel "did not even realize that they were departing 
from well-established Utah precedent." Menzies, No. 880161 slip 
op. at 7. Finally, in stating that Brook's criminal record was 
"not properly part of [the probable cause] determination," 
Brooks, 849 P.2d at 644, the Brooks panel provided no meaningful 
analysis or supporting authority. Menzies, No. 880161 slip op. 
at 7. Based on the foregoing, insofar as Brooks suggests that 
prior convictions are never properly included in a search warrant 
affidavit, it is clearly erroneous and should be overruled. 
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B. Defendant's Prior Convictions Were 
Properly Included in the Search Warrant 
Affidavit 
Notwithstanding, the Court may well determine that 
defendant's 1986 drug related convictions contributed little to 
the magistrate's probable cause determination.3 The State 
agrees that the age of the prior criminal history relates to its 
relevancy for purposes of establishing probable cause. The more 
remote the criminal history, the less likely it is to contribute 
to the existence of current probable cause. Cf. Stromberg, 783 
P.2d at 55, 57 (approximately eight year old conviction for 
unlawful possession held to support determination that Stromberg 
was involved in an ongoing pattern of marijuana use). Moreover, 
under no circumstance could a suspect's prior criminal history 
constitute the sole basis for the establishment of probable cause 
to search. However, neither is a suspect's criminal history to 
be completely discarded. The real issue then is the particular 
weight to be accorded the suspect's prior convictions, under the 
3
 Indeed, as a further predicate to its decision to 
excise defendant's prior convictions from the search warrant 
affidavit, the Court cited Stromberg, for the proposition that 
11
 [s] tale information such as prior convictions cannot be the sole 
basis for determining that probable cause exists." 783 P.2d at 
56-57. As set forth, infra, in the body of this subsection, the 
State does not dispute the Court's determination that prior 
convictions alone are insufficient to establish current probable 
cause. However, Stromberg provides negligible, if any, support 
for the Court's conclusion. To the contrary, Stromberg 
recognized that inclusion of Stromberg's then approximately eight 
year old conviction for marijuana possession in the search 
warrant affidavit supported the magistrate's determination that 
"'there was an ongoing pattern of marijuana use in the home.'" 
Id. at 57. 
10 
totality of the circumstances of each case. See Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233 (1983). 
Certainly, an important factor for consideration is the 
relationship of the prior criminal history to the current 
allegation of criminality. For example, a prior robbery 
conviction may not be helpful in corroborating or demonstrating 
that the suspect is currently engaged in drug trafficking. 
However, as shown in Singleton, a prior record of drug related 
offenses will certainly be probative of current allegations 
implicating the suspect in a protracted drug trafficking scheme. 
854 P.2d at 1021. See also Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1204, 1206 
(suspect's prior convictions for burglary and auto theft helped 
to establish probable cause of his involvement in suspected 
burglary and theft). Because defendant's prior convictions were 
drug related they are relevant and at least corroborative of the 
informant's assertion of defendant's involvement in drug 
possession and trafficking. Singleton, 854 P.2d at 1021; 
Stromberg 783 P.2d at 57. Defendant's prior drug related 
convictions may also properly suggest that his involvement was of 
a protracted and ongoing nature. Id. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument, the State respectfully 
requests the Court to modify its opinion in this case and retract 
any suggestion that a suspect's prior criminal history is never 
properly part of the magistrate's probable cause determination. 
In so doing, the Court should overrule Brooks and acknowledge 
11 
Utah case law recognizing the legitimate bases for including a 
suspect's prior criminal history in the search warrant affidavit: 
To corroborate inculpatory information received from confidential 
sources and/or to establish the suspect's continuous involvement 
in a protracted criminal enterprise. Finally, the Court should 
recognize that defendant's drug related convictions are relevant 
to his current drug use and trafficking. Thus, although the 
convictions may have contributed little to the ultimate probable 
cause determination, they are nonetheless corroborative of the 
confidential informant's allegation of defendant's involvement in 
related criminality. 
The State certifies that this petition is presented in 
good faith and not for delay. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~5Q day of March, 1994 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
HAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 930204-CA 
v. : 
DENNIS RICHARD VIGH, : Priority No. 2 
De f endant/Appe11ant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of 
marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) and 8(l)(b)(ii) (Supp. 1993), and 
possession of cocaine, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) and 8(2)(b)(ii) (Supp. 1993). Because the foregoing 
offenses were committed within a 1,000 feet of school property, 
the convictions were enhanced to second degree felonies, under 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (5) (a) and 8(5) (c) (Supp. 1993). 
Defendant also appeals from a conviction for possession of 
marijuana without tax stamps affixed, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-19-105, 59-19-106 (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider the appeal 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was the warrant authorizing the search of 
defendant's residence supported by probable cause? 
A magistrate's probable cause determination is given 
great deference on review. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 
(1983). The affidavit supporting a search warrant application 
must, however, provide a "'substantial basis for determining the 
existence of probable cause.'" United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897, 915 (1984) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 239). The 
"substantial basis" requirement entails limited review of the 
magistrate's determination, asking only whether the affidavit 
contains sufficient factual information upon which a magistrate 
could have found probable cause. See Gates 462 U.S. at 236. 
This Court reviews the trial court's "factual findings 
underlying the denial of a motion to suppress evidence under a 
'clearly erroneous' standard," and the trial court's conclusions 
of law based thereon are reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 643 (Utah App.), cert, denied. No. 930182, 
Aug. 11, 1993 (unpublished order). 
2. Was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's 
finding that counts I-II were committed within 1,000 feet of a 
school for purposes of sentence enhancement under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(5)(a) and (5)(c) (Supp. 1993)? 
In reviewing a claim of insufficiency of evidence, Utah 
appellate courts view the evidence and all inferences that may 
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the 
jury verdict. State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985); 
State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah App. 1992), cert, 
denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). A jury verdict will only be 
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reversed where reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted. State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 
1989); Lemons, 844 P.2d at 381. 
3. Was^the evidence sufficient to support defendant's 
conviction for possession of cocaine? 
The standard of review for this issue is the same as 
that set forth in issue (2), supra. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
statutes and rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues 
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with possession of 
marijuana with intent to distribute, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) and 8(1)(b)(ii) 
(Supp. 1993) and possession of cocaine, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) and 8(2)(b)(ii) 
(Supp. 1993) . The State further charged the foregoing offenses 
should be enhanced to second degree felonies, under Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 58-37-8 (5) (a) and 8(5) (c) (Supp. 1993), because they were 
committed within a 1,000 feet of a school. Additionally, the 
State charged defendant with possession of marijuana without tax 
stamps affixed, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 59-19-105, 59-19-106 (1990) (R. 204). 
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Defendant filed multiple pro se motions, including a 
motion to suppress contraband seized during a warrant-supported 
search of his mobile home in alleged violation of the fourth 
amendment (R. 40). 
After conducting an evidentiary hearing, wherein 
defendant was represented by privately retained counsel, the 
trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress (R. 77, 286-
87) . 
A jury trial was held February 4, 1993 and defendant 
was convicted as charged (R. 155, 160-162). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to two concurrent, 
enhanced terms of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison 
for counts I-II, and one consecutive term of zero to five years 
in the Utah State Prison for count III (R. 231, 246). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. The Warrant*Supported Search 
The critical facts are set forth in the search warrant 
affidavit (R. 79, attached as Addendum A). The affidavit was 
submitted by Officer Gary Haws of the Bountiful City Police 
Department, an experienced narcotics officer, and had been 
reviewed by a county attorney (R. 260-62, 324-27), see Addendum 
A. Officer Haws sought a warrant to search defendant's mobile 
home for: 
Controlled substances including marijuana and 
cocaine [•] Items of drug paraphernalia [.] 
Documents evidencing the sale of controlled 
substances[.] Documents evidencing the 
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ownership and occupancy of the residence 
(and) [m]oney. 
1. Confidential Informant 
The affidavit set forth information obtained from a 
confidential informant who received no "remuneration for the 
information provided." See Addendum A. The informant told 
Officer Haws that he/she "[was] knowledgeable about marijuana 
because [he/she] had used it in the past." Id. The informant 
then reported that defendant "is engaged in the sale of marijuana 
and cocaine." Id. Specifically, the informant alleged he/she 
had "seen" marijuana, cocaine and drug paraphernalia "in 
[defendant's] presence" and "at [defendant's] residence during 
the last 10 days." Id. The informant provided Officer Haws with 
defendant's address, stating that defendant lived "a few blocks 
south of Crown Billiards," in the "Clearfield Trailer Park, #66." 
Additionally, the informant stated that "during the 
last 10 days" he/she observed marijuana "in [defendant's] 
presence in his (defendant's) vehicle." See Addendum A. The 
informant described defendant/s vehicle as a "1988 Ford Tempo, 
two-door, creme in color, license number 217 EVE." Id. 
Finally, the informant stated that defendant "was 
selling a large amount of controlled substance" and that he 
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consequently kept "a large amount of money" at Pam Tucker's1 
home in Sunset, Utah. See Addendum A. According to the 
informant, defendant had been under Tucker's home and "may have 
stashed something there." Id. 
2. Verification and Corroboration 
Although Officer Haws had not previously known or 
worked with the informant (R. 262-63), he and other investigating 
officers were able to verify and corroborate the information 
provided. Specifically, investigating officers verified that 
defendant lived in the Clearfield Trailer Park at #66. See 
Addendum A. The investigating officers were also able to verify 
that a 1989 Ford with license plate number 217 EVE was registered 
in defendant's name. Id. 
Officer Haws conducted a consensual search of Pam 
Tucker's home in Sunset, Utah, and discovered "three to four 
pounds of marijuana underneath the home in a crawl space." See 
Addendum A. The search also revealed approximately $12,000 in 
cash. Id. 
Finally, Officer Haws obtained defendant's criminal 
history which revealed that defendant had been previously 
convicted in June 1986 for arranging the sale of a controlled 
substance, and attempted distribution of a controlled substance, 
1
 Although not stated in the affidavit, Officer Haws 
testified at a subsequent hearing that Tucker was defendant's 
girlfriend (R. 267-69). 
€ 
both third degree felonies. See Addendum A.2 Further, 
defendant was charged with possession of controlled substances in 
1980 and in 1983, and as recently as March, 1990, which latter 
charge was "disposed of by diversion." Id. 
Based on the foregoing, the search warrant affidavit 
requested authority to conduct a daytime search. See Addendum A. 
This request was buttressed by Officer Haws statement that he 
believed the "information reliable based upon the fact that the 
informant has come forward as a citizen and [was] not receiving 
any renumeration for the information provided." Id. 
4. Seizure of Evidence 
The search warrant was issued as requested on June 16, 
1992 (R. 79, 268, 282), see Addendum A. Pursuant thereto, 
officers seized approximately one pound of marijuana (R. 369), 
and baggies, scales, and other drug paraphernalia containing 
cocaine residue (R. 479-483). 
Defendant was arrested just prior to the execution of 
the search warrant, based on the discovery of contraband at Pam 
Tucker's home (R. 372). The following items were seized incident 
to defendant's arrest: defendant's driver's license (which also 
contained cocaine residue), approximately $6,028 in cash, and a 
bottle of Prozac, in the name of another individual (R. 329-30, 
492-93). 
2
 Officer Haws attached to the instant affidavit, copies 
of a search warrant affidavit and search warrant executed in 
December 1985, which apparently lead to defendant's 1986 
convictions. See Addendum A. 
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5. Motion to Suppress 
Defendant filed a pro se motion to suppress the 
evidence seized pursuant to the warrant-supported search of his 
trailer (R. 40, attached as Addendum B). Specifically, defendant 
alleged that information concerning his prior criminal history 
was improperly included in the search warrant affidavit in 
violation of the fifth, fourth and fourteenth amendments to the 
United States Constitution. Id, 
Defendant retained counsel to represent him at a 
hearing on his various pro se motions held October 27, 1992 (R. 
255). In conjunction with the motion to suppress, defendant's 
hearing counsel argued defendant's pro se motion for discovery 
(R. 38-39), wherein defendant requested the State to reveal the 
confidential informant's identity (R. 256). In support of his 
motion, defendant examined Officer Haws in an attempt to 
demonstrate the officer either intentionally, knowingly, or 
recklessly included false information in the affidavit (R. 259). 
The court denied defendant's discovery motion, 
concluding "there was no substantial preliminary showing that 
Detective Haws intentionally or knowingly or with reckless 
disregard for truth, falsely swore relative to any information 
received from the informant [;] ,f thus, defendant had not 
demonstrated a basis for identifying the informant (R. 91, a 
complete copy of the trial court's Order is attached as Addendum 
C). 
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Concerning the motion to suppress, defendant's hearing 
counsel made no additional argument, but recalled Officer Haws 
(R. 281-286) . Following Officer Haws testimony, the trial court 
similarly denied defendant's motion to suppress: 
[T]he Court would find that under the law we 
are required to look at the totality of the 
circumstances and the information contained 
in the affidavit for search warrants [sic] 
and that information needs to be looked at in 
whether or not it provides a substantial 
basis for the magistrate to conclude that 
there was probable cause to believe that 
there was contraband or evidence of crime 
located in a certain place and describe that 
place with such specificity. 
In looking at the affidavit that was 
presented in this particular case, 
particularly the information provided by the 
confidential informant, when the reliability 
of that informant was tested and determined 
as was done by the officer herein, the Court 
would find that in looking at the affidavit 
as a whole, there is a substantial basis from 
which the magistrate could have concluded 
that there was contraband or evidence of 
illegality in the trailer of the defendant 
and as it was described, that trailer was 
significant particularly for those executing 
the warrant to know where to look, and 
therefore the Court will deny the motion to 
suppress. 
(R. 286). The trial court subsequently filed written findings of 
fact: 
1. The confidential informant provided 
Detective Gay Haws of the Davis Metro 
Narcotics Strike Force with certain 
information about the defendant including his 
place of residence, his use and possession of 
controlled substances, his vehicle and his 
criminal background. 
2. The informant provided the detective with 
information that drugs were being stored at 
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the residence of Pam Tucker along with a 
large amount of cash. 
3. Detective Haws went to the residence of 
Pam Tucker and located approximately [six] 
pounds of marijuana and $12,000 in cash 
consistent with the information provided by 
the informant. 
4. Detective Haws was able to confirm the 
information relative to defendant's 
residence, vehicle and criminal background as 
provided by the informant* 
5. The informant received no renumeration 
for any of the information given to Detective 
Haws. 
(R. 92) , see Addendum C. 
Based on the foregoing findings, the court concluded 
that the affidavit set forth "sufficient" probable cause for the 
issuance of the search warrant (R. 93), see Addendum C. 
Defendant was represented by current defense counsel at trial (R. 
298). Defense counsel again raised the motion to suppress, but 
asserted no new arguments: 
I was not representing Mr. Vigh at that time, 
but it's [sic] my understanding of case law 
under those circumstances, I don't have to 
reobject to the admission of this evidence 
based on the same judge. So rather than 
having me object to 38 pieces of evidence, 
which Mr. McGuire called, I would just like 
it known that I would object to the 
introduction of any evidence obtained as a 
result of the search which we contend was 
obtained in violation of Mr. Vigh's 
constitutional guarantees and so I will not 
be making -- well, I would like this to serve 
as a continuing objection to any evidence 
obtained as a result of either of the search 
warrants. 
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(R. 306-07). In reasserting the motion to suppress, defense 
counsel incorporated evidence seized incident to defendant's 
arrest (R. 307). 
B. Cocaine Residue 
James Gaskill, of the Weber State University Crime 
Laboratory, tested residue samples taken from the various drug 
paraphernalia seized from defendant's trailer, as well as from 
defendant's driver's license (R. 479-83, 492-493). In all, 
Gaskill performed three separate tests on the samples: 1) a 
cobalt thiocyanate test, which revealed the presence of cocaine 
hydrochloride; 2) a gold bromide test, which revealed the 
presence of recrystallized cocaine; and 3) a gas chromatography 
test, which similarly confirmed that the samples contained 
cocaine (R. 480-81, 492-93). 
Although there was a sufficient amount of residue upon 
which to conduct the foregoing tests, Gaskill was not able to 
measure or otherwise quantify the cocaine residue (R. 485). 
Further, Gaskill noted that the residue amounts were consumable, 
but it was not likely the residue was a sufficient amount "for 
any kind of reaction on the part of the individual who consumed 
it" (R. 486). 
C. Sentence Enhancement 
Investigating officers made several measurements to 
determine that defendant's mobile home was located within 1,000 
feet of Pioneer Adult Rehabilitation Center. The officers 
11 
obtained a blueprint of Clearfield City from the planning 
division of Clearfield City Corporation (R. 416, Exh. 35).3 
After determining the blueprint was drawn to a scale of one inch 
for every 400 feet, the officers drew a 1,000 foot radius 
emanating from the center of the mobile home park, which radius 
cut through the middle of the rehabilitation center property. 
IdL 
Additionally, Officer Haws used a roller-meter to 
measure the distance from defendant's trailer to the 
rehabilitation center, stepping off two different routes (R. 355-
58}. The first pedestrian route measured 983 feet (R. 357). The 
second, more direct route, measured 722 feet. Id. Both routes 
required trespassing across railroad tracks running between the 
rehabilitation center and the mobile home park (R. 360, Exh. 35). 
The officer also climbed through some holes in a six foot chain-
link fence surrounding the mobile home park (R. 359-60). Officer 
Haws estimated that a non-trespassory pedestrian route between 
the center and defendant's trailer would accede 1,000 feet, but 
did not make an exact measurement with the roller-meter (R. 360-
61) . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly concluded that the search 
warrant affidavit set forth a substantial basis for the 
magistrate's probable cause determination. The affidavit 
3
 As depicted on the blueprint (Exh. 35), defendant's 
mobile home park is outlined in red and the rehabilitation center 
is outlined in blue (R. 416). 
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properly included defendant's criminal history as corroborative 
of the confidential informant's allegations concerning 
defendant's involvement in drug trafficking. Based on the 
officer's corroboration of defendant's criminal history and other 
information provided by the informant, there is no clear error in 
the trial court's determination that the informant was reliable. 
Thus, the trial court's affirmance of the magistrate's probable 
cause determination should be upheld. 
The evidence was sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt 
to support the jury's finding that counts I-II were committed 
within 1,000 feet of a school and were thus subject to an 
enhanced penalty. Defendant does not dispute evidence that his 
mobile home was located within a 1,000 foot radius of the school. 
Rather, defendant contends the method of measurement should take 
into account physical and legal barriers separating the school 
and the site of the offense. However, the straight line method 
for measuring the statutory distance used here is consistent with 
the policy objectives underlying the school zone enhancement 
provision and should be expressly adopted by the Court as the 
proper method for determining the statutory distance. 
As for defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support his conviction for cocaine possession, the 
Court should not even consider it because defendant has not 
properly marshaled the evidence supporting the jury's verdict. 
Even if the Court were to consider the merits of defendant's 
claim, there was ample evidence before the jury to demonstrate 
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that defendant's possession of the cocaine residue was knowing 
and intentional, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT SETS FORTH A 
SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR THE MAGISTRATE'S 
PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION AND THERE IS NO 
CLEAR ERROR IN THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DETERMINATION CONCERNING THE CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMANT'S RELIABILITY 
Defendant challenges the trial court's affirmance of 
the magistrate's probable cause determination, alleging that the 
search warrant affidavit 1) improperly set forth defendant's 
criminal history and 2) "contains no indication of veracity or 
reliability regarding the confidential inf ormant [ • ] ff Br. of App. 
at 9-11. Contrary to defendant's assertions, his criminal 
history was properly included in the affidavit as corroborative 
of the confidential informant's allegation of defendant's 
criminal conduct. Moreover, there is no clear error in the trial 
court's finding that the affidavit was sufficient to establish 
the confidential informant's reliability. Accordingly, the trial 
court's affirmance of the magistrate's probable cause 
determination was proper. 
A. Deferential Review of Magistrate's 
Probable Cause Determination 
When a search warrant is challenged as having been 
issued without probable cause, the reviewing court does not 
conduct a de novo review of the magistrate's determination of 
probable cause; rather, to uphold the warrant, the reviewing 
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court must simply conclude that the magistrate had a "substantial 
basis" for determining that probable cause existed. State v. 
Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989); State v. Avala. 762 P.2d 
1107, 1110 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). 
In conducting its examination, the reviewing court "should 
consider a search warrant affidavit %in its entirety and in a 
common-sense fashion.'" Babbell, 770 P.2d at 991 (quoting State 
v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985)); State v. Purser, 
828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992). "Finally, the reviewing 
court should pay 'great deference' to the magistrate's decision." 
Babbell, 770 P.2d at 991 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 236 (1983)) . 
B. Totality-of-the-Circumstances and 
Informant Reliability 
An informant's veracity, reliability and basis of 
knowledge are factors to be considered in determining whether, 
under the totality of the circumstances, probable cause exists. 
Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 233. However, 
"[t]hey are not strict, independent requirements to be 'rigidly 
extracted' in every case." State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 
(Utah 1987) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 230). Rather, their 
significance varies under the circumstances of each case. 
Purser, 828 P.2d at 517 (citing State v. Bailev. 675 P.2d 1203, 
1205 (Utah 1984)). For example, "if the circumstances as a whole 
demonstrate the truthfulness of the informant's report, a less 
strong showing is required." Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. 
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C. The Instant Case 
Applying the Gates test to Officer Haws' affidavit, the 
truthfulness of the informant's report is adequately 
demonstrated. While the first time informant had not previously 
supplied information to any of the investigating officers, that 
fact is not critical to the probable cause determination because 
-the informant's veracity and reliability is otherwise 
demonstrated. Purser. 828 P.2d at 517. See also United v. 
Harris. 403 U.S. 573, 581-582 (1971) (upholding search warrant 
affidavit based on information gleaned from a first time 
informant; "this Court [has] never suggested that an averment of 
previous reliability was necessary"). Accord State v. Germane 
559 A.2d 1031, 1035 (R.I. 1989); Meiia v. State. 761 S.W.2d 35, 
39 (Tex. App. 1988); State v. Pavne. 271 N.W.2d 350, 351 (Neb. 
1978). 
1. Confidential Informant's Veracity and Reliability 
Indeed, "[c]ourts have consistently approved the 
issuance of search warrants where the informant's knowledge is 
based on personal observation." Purser. 828 P.2d at Sl7. See 
also State v. Strombercr, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah App. 1989), cert. 
denied. 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990); State v. White. 851 P.2d 1195, 
1199 (Utah App. 1993). Here, the affidavit clearly states the 
.basis of the informant's knowledge was his/her first hand 
observation of defendant's criminality. See Addendum A. 
Moreover, the observations were recent, occurring in the "last 10 
days" prior to the warrant's issuance. Id. 
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The informant's veracity is further buttressed by the 
fact that he/she received nothing in exchange for the information 
provided. See Addendum A. Purser, 828 P.2d at 517; State v. 
Blaha, 851 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Brooks. 849 
P.2d 640, 645 (Utah App. 1993), cert, denied. No. 930182 (Utah 
Aug. 11, 1993). Similarly demonstrative of the informant's 
veracity is the informant's admission against his/her penal 
interest, that he/she had previously used marijuana.4 See 
Addendum A. Harris, 403 U.S. at 583-84 ("Admissions of crime, 
like admissions against proprietary interests, carry their own 
indicia of credibility[.]"). Accord People v. Turcotte-
Schaeffer, 843 P.2d 658, 661 (Colo. 1993); State v. Erwin, 789 
S.W.2d 509, 511 (Mo. App. 1990); State v. O'Connor. 692 P.2d 208, 
212 (Wash. App. 1984). 
4
 At trial, defendant was represented by current counsel, 
who questioned Officer Haws concerning a search of the 
confidential informant's residence conducted sometime prior to 
the execution of the instant search warrant (R. 361-62) . The 
officer testified that approximately six pounds of marijuana was 
discovered and that the informant had not been charged with any 
criminal conduct as a result of the search. Id. Defense counsel 
did not further pursue the matter below, nor has he specifically 
addressed it on appeal. 
Rather, on appeal defendant merely asserts that the 
affidavit "contradicts itself" because it states "that the 
confidential informant is a citizen informant who is not 
receiving renumeration, and then affirmatively assert [s] that the 
informant is a known user of controlled substances." Br. of App. 
at 10. However, contrary to defendant's allegation, the 
foregoing conduct is not contradictory. Although the informant 
was previously involved in drugs, he/she, for whatever reason, 
decided to cooperate with law enforcement in this case. 
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2. Independent Corroboration of Significant Facts 
Additionally, the informant's reliability was manifest 
by the officers' independent corroboration of the significant 
facts. See Addendum A. Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. As alleged by 
the informant, the officers found approximately four pounds of 
marijuana in the crawl space of Pam Tucker's home, as well as 
$12,000 in cash. See Addendum A. The officers were also able to 
verify defendant's address, and vehicle, consistent with the 
information provided by the informant. Id. Because the 
informant was found to be reliable concerning the above 
information, his/her assertion that defendant was involved in 
drug trafficking was therefore likely to be similarly reliable. 
See Gates, 462 U.S. at 244 (because an informant is shown to be 
right about some things, he is probably right about other facts 
that he has alleged including the claim that the object of the 
tip is engaged in criminal activity). 
As further corroboration of the informant's 
allegations, Officer Haws obtained defendant's criminal history 
which indicated defendant had two prior convictions for drug 
related offenses in 1986, as well as a 1990 charge for possession 
of a controlled substance which was "disposed of by diversion." 
See Addendum A. Relying on Brooks. 849 P.2d at 644, defendant 
asserts his criminal record cannot properly "be considered in the 
probable cause determination." Br. of App. at 9. Defendant's 
reliance on Brooks is misplaced. 
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In Brooks, the Court determined that information Brooks 
was under investigation for drug trafficking in a neighboring 
jurisdiction, and also had a criminal history of drug related 
offenses, did nothing to establish probable cause that he was 
involved in drug trafficking at the time the search warrant was 
issued. 849 P.2d at 644. However, the central issue in Brooks 
was not the propriety of including Brooks' criminal history in 
the affidavit, but whether the informant's controlled buys from 
Brooks, which were also set forth in the affidavit, provided a 
substantial basis for the magistrate's probable cause 
determination. 849 P.2d at 643-45. Thus, neither the parties, 
nor the Court, focused on the criminal history issue raised here. 
This lack of focus is demonstrated in the Court's 
comments concerning inclusion of Brooks' criminal history in the 
search warrant affidavit. Specifically, the Court neither 
reviewed nor acknowledged relevant authority from the United 
States Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court and this Court 
recognizing that a defendant's prior criminal history is properly 
included in a search warrant affidavit as corroborative of the 
informant's assertions of criminality. See Jones v. United 
States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960) (Court upheld search warrant 
affidavit containing statement that Jones had previously admitted 
using narcotics on the ground that the information "made the 
charge against [Jones] much less subject to scepticism than would 
be such a charge against one without such a history11); Bailev, 
675 P.2d at 1206 (upholding search warrant affidavit where there 
19 
was "prior verification of significant facts [,]" including "a 
prior police record of the individual suspected of having 
committed the crime"); Stromberq. 783 P.2d at 55 (noting 
defendant's prior conviction for unlawful possession corroborated 
informant's statements); State v. Buford. 820 P.2d 1381, 1385 
(Utah App. 1991) (finding affidavit adequately established 
informant reliability based, in part, on officers' verification 
of defendant's prior criminal record). Accord Commonwealth v. 
Spano, 605 N.E.2d 1241, 1246 (Mass. 1993) (independent police 
corroboration of informant's allegations properly included 
defendant's criminal history); People v. Maldonado, 465 N.Y.S.2d 
958, 962 (N.Y. Sup. 1983) (defendant's criminal history "is 
corroborative in nature -- that is, there is much less skepticism 
surrounding an informant's information than would be the case if 
.the police were not aware of the defendant's prior, drug-related 
criminal history"); State v. Pannebaker, 714 P.2d 904, 907 (Colo. 
1986) (defendant's prior criminal record of drug-related offenses 
corroborated details of informant's tip). 
Further, in State v. Singleton, another panel of this 
Court rejected a staleness challenge to the search warrant 
affidavit on the ground the affidavit recited facts "indicating 
[Singleton] was involved in continuous and ongoing criminal 
activity," including delineation of "a substantial history of 
controlled substance violations.11 854 P.2d 1017, 1021 (Utah App. 
1993). Thus, "[v]iewed under the totality of the circumstances," 
the Singleton court found the "information contained in the 
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affidavit sufficiently demonstrate[d] probable continuous and 
contemporaneous criminal activity at defendant's residence." Id. 
On the other hand, the only indication Brooks was 
involved in an ongoing drug trafficking scheme was a "concerned 
citizen complaint that occurred some nine months earlier." 
Brooks, 849 P.2d at 644. Consequently, the Brooks affidavit, 
unlike the Singleton affidavit, was found inadequate to establish 
the probable existence of continuous criminal activity. The 
Court thus determined that inclusion of Brooks' criminal history 
did not contribute to the probable cause determination in that 
case. Brooks. 849 P.2d at 644. See also State v. Potter, 221 
Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 30 (Utah App. 1993) (concluding that fact 
Potter was under investigation by local drug agencies and fact 
that his companion was a convicted drug user, without more, 
failed to establish controlled substances would presently be 
found in his trailer). 
However, had the facts alleged in the Brooks affidavit 
established ongoing criminal activity, Brooks' criminal record 
may well have properly contributed to the probable cause 
determination. See, e.g., Singleton, 854 P.2d at 1021. 
Additionally, although the Brooks panel failed to consider the 
issue, Brooks' criminal record was at least corroborative of the 
informant's allegations and was arguably properly included in the 
affidavit on that ground. See Jones, 362 U.S. at 271; Bailey. 
675 P.2d at 1206; Stromberg, 783 P.2d at 55; Buford, 820 P.2d at 
1385. See also State v. Lee, No. 920566-CA, slip op. at 12 (Utah 
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App. October 22, 1993) (recognizing affiant officer's knowledge 
of suspect's "history of substance abuse and sales,ff helped to 
corroborate confidential informant's observations of 
criminality). For these reasons, the Brooks analysis is 
meaningful only as applied to the unique facts of that case and 
should not be read to preclude consideration of a suspect's 
criminal history in all cases. Thus, Brooks notwithstanding, 
defendant's criminal history was properly included in the search 
warrant affidavit if for no other purpose than to corroborate the 
informant's allegations of defendant's criminality. 
Based on the foregoing analysis of the search warrant 
affidavit, defendant's assertions fail to demonstrate any clear 
error in the trial court's determination that the informant's 
reliability was adequately established (R. 286). See also (R. 
92), see Addendum C. Brooks v. State, 431 S.E.2d 466 (Ga. App. 
1993) (trial court's determination of informant reliability 
subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review). Accord 
Brooks, 849 P.2d at 643 ("factual findings underlying the denial 
of a motion to suppress evidence" are reviewed under a 'clearly 
erroneous' standard). The trial court's affirmance of the 
magistrate's probable cause determination was proper and should 
be upheld. 
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POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
JURY'S FINDING THAT THE OFFENSES OCCURRED 
WITHIN 1,000 FEET OF A SCHOOL FOR PURPOSES OF 
SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 
58-37-8(5) (a) and 8(5) (c) (SUPP. 1993) 
Defendant contends "[t]here is insufficient evidence to 
support the jury verdict that [defendant's actions took place 
within 1,000 feet of a school." Br. of App. at 11. In so 
arguing, "[d]efendant asks the Court to define the most direct 
non-trespassory route available as the proper measurement" for 
calculating the distance from his mobile home to the school for 
purposes of sentence enhancement under Utah Code Ann. 58-37-
8(5)(a), (c) (Supp. 1993). Br. of App. at 16. Defendant's 
argument is inconsistent with the underlying policy objectives of 
the statutory enhancement scheme and should be rejected. 
A. Sufficiency Standard 
The power of this Court to review a jury verdict 
challenged on sufficiency of evidence is "quite limited." State 
v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 783 (Utah App. 1990). As this Court has 
recognized, 
[i]n challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence, the burden on the defendant is 
heavy. Defendant must 'marshal all evidence 
supporting the jury's verdict and must then 
show how this marshaled evidence is 
insufficient to support the verdict even when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict.' 
State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah App. 1992) (citations 
omitted), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). 
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B. The Instant Case 
Although defendant has marshaled the evidence 
supporting the jury's verdict, Br. of App. at 12-13, he has not 
demonstrated that, viewed in its most favorable light, the 
evidence is insufficient to support the jury's enhancement 
verdict. Specifically, defendant does not dispute evidence that 
his mobile home is located within a 1,000 foot radius of the 
rehabilitation center. Br. of App. at 16. Rather, 
notwithstanding the evidence, defendant contends the straight 
line method used to calculate the statutory distance (R. 416, 
Exh. 35) is improper because it does not take into account chain-
link fencing surrounding the mobile home park, or railroad 
property rights. Br. of App. at 16.5 Defendant suggests a 
proper measuring system under the statute would take into account 
physical and legal barriers between the school and the site of 
the offense. Defendant's tortuous reading of the enhancement 
provision should be rejected. 
1. Utah's Enhancement Provision 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5) (a) (ix) (Supp. 1993) 
provides for the enhancement of certain drug related offenses 
committed "within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or 
grounds included in Subsections 5(a)(i) through (viii)[.] 
5
 Defendant also asserts that the rehabilitation center 
is surrounded by a barbed wire fence. Br. of App. at 16. 
However, defendant provides no record support for this assertion. 
State v. Cook. 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1986); State v. Bingham, 
684 P.2d 43, 46 (Utah 1984) (reviewing court cannot consider 
matters outside of the record). 
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Subsection (5)(a)(ii) prohibits the commission of drug related 
offenses "in a public or private vocational school or post-
secondary school or on the grounds of any of those schools[.]"6 
The Utah Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
6
 As noted, section 58-37-8 (5) (a) enumerates several 
locations or zones where, if a drug related offense is committed 
therein, the perpetrator is subject to enhanced "penalties and 
classifications under [s]ubsection (5)(b)[.]M However, 
subsection (5)(b) provides only for the enhancement of first 
degree felony convictions. The enhancement of convictions which 
are "less than a first degree felony" is addressed in subsection 
(5)(c), which subsection is not expressly referenced in 
subsection (5)(a). 
The legislature's failure to expressly refer to both 
subsection (5)(b) and subsection (5)(c) in subsection (5)(a) is 
merely a technical omission and should not be read to prohibit 
enhancement of convictions other than first degree felony 
convictions. Indeed, the school zone enhancement provision only 
makes sense when subsection (5)(a) is read to incorporate both 
subsection (5)(b) and subsection (5)(c). The only logical 
construction of subsection (5) is that the legislature intended 
to enhance any conviction for a drug-related offense committed 
within the prohibited areas specified in subsection (5)(a). To 
construe the statute otherwise is to defeat its purpose. See 
Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 26 Utah 2d 100, 485 P.2d 1035 
(Utah 1971) ("where there is ambiguity or uncertainty in a 
portion of a statute, it is proper to look to the entire act in 
order to discern its meaning and intent; and if it is reasonably 
susceptible of different interpretations, the one should be 
chosen which best harmonizes with its general purpose"); 
RDG Assoc./Jorman Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n., 741 P.2d 948, 951 
(Utah 1987) ("a proper construction of the statute must further 
its purposes"); Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R.. 749 
P.2d 660, 672 (Utah App.) (same), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1278 
(Utah 1988). See also Sutherland's Stat. Constr. §46.05 at 103 
(5th Ed.) ("a statutory subsection may not be considered in a 
vacuum, but must be considered in reference to the statute as a 
whole"). 
Finally, defendant has not complained of the matter on 
appeal and the State's suggested construction has been implicitly 
recognized by the Court- See State v. Strombera, 783 P.2d 54, 
59-60 (Utah App. 1989) (affirming without comment Stromberg's 
ehanced third degree felony conviction for unlawful possession of 
marijuana within 1,000 feet of a public school), cert, denied, 
795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
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section 58-37-8(5) in State v. Moore. 782 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
Specifically, Moore argued that the school zone enhancement 
provision violated equal protection because it "treat[ed] drug 
dealers in small towns differently from those in large cities." 
Id. at 503. The court's comments in rejecting Moore's 
constitutional challenge suggest that a straight line method for 
measuring the statutory distance is proper: "'The bright line 
test' is based strictly on distance from the school, regardless 
of the town's population or configuration." Id. The "bright 
line test" articulated in Moore is consistent with the supreme 
court's recognition of the policy objectives underlying the 
legislature's enactment of the school zone enhancement provision: 
[U]nder the police power, the state 
legislature has taken measures to protect the 
public health, safety, and welfare of 
children of Utah from the presumed extreme 
potential danger created when drug 
transactions occur on or near a school 
ground. 
Id-. 
This Court has similarly upheld the constitutionality 
of the enhancement provision,- and has also recognized the 
legislature's intent to create a "drug-free zone" around schools 
"to protect children from the influence of drug-related 
activity." State v. Stromberq, 783 P.2d 54, 60 (Utah App. 1989) 
emphasis added), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
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2 Federal Authority is Persuasive 
It is significant that section 58-37-8(5) was 
"fashioned" after the federal Controlled Substances Penalties • 
Amendments Act of 3 984 Strombercr, 783 P.2d at 59 n.3. The 
federal act, which "increases the penalty for 'distributing, 
possessing wit',h i: :- .* to distribute, or manufacturing a 
controlled substance within enumerated distances from schools, 
colleges, universities, and certain youth fac•; : ;' -? s 
number constitutional challenge.: . J 
Because Utah's enhancement provision is modeled after the federal 
act, interpretative federal case law ^ |>.»»<. ,a^:^ bet e.g., 
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984) ("Case law 
developed under the Fourteenth Amendment may r ~ oersuasive in 
applyi ng Article " of t he Utah Con,-. ;.»: _*.. .on) . 
At least three federal courts of appeal have expressly 
rejected arguments similar to defendant's determining that the 
"S": i -:- *. • *! :iod is cleai ly contemp.ldt.ed t»y i he plain 
meaning .: ederal act- See United States v. Clavis. 956 
F.2d 1079, 1088 (11th Cir.) ("the statutory distance must he 
measured by a straight line method er than,, a pedestrian 
travel route"), cert, denied. _ _ U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 2979 
(1992); United States v. Watson, 887 F.2d 980r 981 (9th Cir.•' 
1989i (" |Wjf in id i,lun t f stance between the school and the 
sale should be measured b-7 * straight line a:,i r.o- any 
"pedestrian" route of travel ~-,,_^,.i^ .v. • _. La>: il , 779 
^ r . i rejecting argument that the 
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statutory distance should be measured by pedestrian route rather 
than by straight line as "tortuous" of the statute's plain 
meaning), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1029 (1986). Cf. United States 
v. Holland, 810 F.2d 1215, 1219 (D.C. Cir.) (purpose of federal 
act was to create a "1000-foot zone of protection" around 
schools), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1057 (1987). See also United 
States v. Robles, 814 F.Supp. 1249, 1251 (E.D.Pa. 1993) ("The 
distance from the protected zone is measured by straight line, 
not by pedestrian route."). Accord State v. Wims. 847 P.2d 8, 12 
(Wash. App. 1993) ("We adhere to the measurement of the 
prohibited zone as the radius of a circle emanating from the 
location of the school grounds."). 
The reasoning behind adoption of a straight line method 
for measuring the statutory distance is sound. As noted by the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the 1,000 foot zone of 
prohibition around schools is 
designed to protect school-children from the 
direct and indirect dangers posed by the 
narcotics trade. School children are not 
known for taking what adults may conclude 
would be the most appropriate routes to and* 
from school. Only a straight line 
measurement creates a readily ascertainable 
zone of protection. . . . This intent to 
create a %drug-free zone around schools,' 
would be defeated if dealers were allowed to 
escape prosecution by creating circuitous 
routes to their narcotic transactions. 
Watson, 887 F.2d at 981. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit similarly reasoned that 
[t]he uncertainties created by the way a 
child meanders, or a drug dealer or buyer 
walks, is antithetical to the expressed 
28 
intention of Congress to create a drug-free 
zone around each school. The way to create a 
definite and identifiable zone is by 
extending radii outward around the property 
on which the school is located. 
Clavis, 956 ; ..9, 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reject 
defendant' s reading of Utal i' s school zone ei lhancement pi o1' ision 
and expressly adopt a straight line method for measuring the 
statutory distance. Only the straight line method is consistent 
with t hfj 1 t-^ Isl at in P ' s ilc-'eii policy object; ive id creating drug-
free zones around Utah's schools. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S 
CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OF COCAINE 
Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support his conviction for cocaine possession, Br. of 
App. at 18-20, should be rejected for failure :; comply with the 
marshaling requirements oi State v. Mooie,, n "M; , ,?F \ 
(Utah App 19 90). As previously noted in Point 11 supra, the 
power of thi s Court to review a jury verdict challenged on 
sufficiency of evidence is "quite 1 uniii ted 1 d Defendant must 
fir st marshal all the supporting evidence, and then show how the 
marshaled evidence is insufficient * support the jury's verdict, 
even when vieweu - . light. State v. Lemons, 
84 4 P 2d J78l( 3P1 —.. citations omitted), cert, 
denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). 
A. Defendant's Failure to Marshal 
Defendant has failed to meet this purposefully heavy 
burden. Rather than marshalling all the evidence supporting the 
jury's verdict and then demonstrating how the marshaled evidence 
is insufficient to support his conviction for cocaine possession, 
defendant asserts that cocaine soiled paper money is so prevalent 
in our society "that one-third of all the people deplaning at 
Salt Lake City from flights from Chicago, and carrying paper 
money, could be charged and convicted of possession of cocaine." 
Br. of App. at 19. Significantly, although large amounts of cash 
were seized from defendant's person and from his trailer, there 
was no allegation below that the money was "cocaine soiled." 
Thus, defendant's argument completely ignores the supporting 
evidence. The Court should refuse to consider defendant's 
insufficiency claim based on his failure to properly marshal the 
evidence supporting the jury's verdict. 
B. Evidence Supports Jury's Determination 
That Defendant's Possession Was Knowing and 
Intentional 
Even if this Court were to consider defendant's 
sufficiency challenge, there was ample evidence to support 
defendant's conviction. Defendant does not argue that the State 
failed to prove he exercised control over the cocaine residue 
seized from his person, and from his trailer. Br. of App. 17. 
Nor does he dispute the narcotic character of the residue seized. 
Id. Defendant's only complaint is "that there was insufficient 
cocaine to justify a conviction." Id. Specifically, defendant 
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asserts that society's resources are bettei spent' prosecuting 
suspects apprehended in possession of larger, quantifiable 
amounts :f controlled substances. Br. of App. at 20. 
Neither this Court; nor the Utah Supreme Coin t ha ve 
expressly determined whether a particular quantity of narcotics 
is necessary to sustain a conviction for possession of a narcotic 
drug St.ate v. Warner, 788 P. 2d 3 04.3 , 3 0431 (Utal :i hpi >. 1990) .7 
Rather, in Utah " [t]he determinative test is possession of a 
narcotic drug, and not useability of a narcotic drug " State v. 
Winters, ] 2 Ut :ai i 2d 3 39 3:96 P 2d 872 874 (Utah 1964). Further, 
"the key in prosecuting for unlawful possession :: narcotics is 
proving that 'the accused exercised dominion ar - nXrol o^ -ei the 
drug with knowledge of its presence and narcotic character.'" 
Warner, 788 P.2d at 1043 (quoting Winters, 396 P.2d at 874). 
The visible amount of dr ug i i I defendant s possession, 
a., via with other circumstantial evidence, was sufficient for the 
jury to determine that defendant's possession was knowing and 
intentional State v, fux, /U^ I~ 2d J 16, 319 (Utah 1986) - is 
significant that the visible cocaine residue in evidence was 
discovered inside drug paraphernalia seized from defendant's 
trail "lei" IH 4 7 u if I) premise/." ever which defendant exercised 
control and exclusive occupancy Id. Cocaine residue was also 
discovered inside the plastic flap of defendant's d r i v e r ' S 
7
 However, both have acknowledged that "*several courts 
have held that no particular quantity of narcotics is necessary 
to sustain a conviction for possession of a narcotic drug.'" 
Warner. 788 P.2d at 1043 (quoting State v. Winters, 3 96 P.2d 8 7 2, 
874 (Utah 1964)). 
license (R. 492-93), a personal effect over which he had special 
control. Fox. 709 P.2d at 319. Thus, viewed in its proper light 
on appeal, the evidence presented at trial provides substantial 
support for the jury's verdict. This Court should reject 
defendant's sufficiency challenge. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the trial court's 
denial of defendant's motion to suppress should be upheld and 
defendant's convictions affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15 day of November, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
GLEN T. CELLA, KING & KING, attorney for appellant, P.O. Box 320, 
Kaysville, Utah 84 037, this /O day of November, 1993. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
MELVIN C. WILSON 
Davis County Attorney 
80C West State Street 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Telephone: 451-4300 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CLEARFIELD DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, I AFFIDAVIT FOR 
In Re: Search of the mobile home: SEARCH WARRANT 
located at 442 South State, #66, 
Clearfield, a single wide trailer: 
beige in color with dark brown 
trim, occupied by Dennis Richard : 
Vigh and the vehicle described 
as a 1989 Ford Tempo, license : 
#217 EVE, vin #1FAPP31X7KK103453, 
registered to Dennis Vigh. : 
COUNTY OF DAVIS % 
STATE OF UTAH ) ss. 
VanWagenen, Circuit Court Judge, the 
undersigned, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that there 
is probable cause to believe that on the premises find \ a h if Ilk1" 
described as follows: 
The mobile home located at 442 South State, #66, 
Clearfield, Utah, a single wide trailer beige in 
color with dark brown trim, occupied by Dennis 
Richard Vigh; and a 1989 Ford Tempo, license 
number 217 EVE, vin #1FAPP31X7KK103453, registered 
to Dennis Richard Vigh* 
there is now certain property or evidence described as: 
Controlled substances including marijuana and cocaine 
Items of drug paraphernalia 
Documents evidencing the sale of controlled substances 
Documents evidencing the ownership and occupancy of the 
residence 
Money 
and that said property or evidence was unlawfully acquired and is 
being unlawfully possessed and is evidence of the crime of 
possession of controlled substances. 
The facts to establish the issuance of this warrant are 
as follows: 
1. Affiant received information from a confidential 
informant that Dennis Richard Vigh is engaged in the sale of 
marijuana and cocaine. The informant stated that Vigh resides in 
Clearfield at the Clearfield Trailer Park, #66, located a few 
blocks south of Crown Billiards. The informant stated that 
marijuana was seen in the presence of Vigh personally by the 
informant and the informant is knowledgeable about marijuana 
because the informant has used it in the past. The informant 
also indicated that cocaine and paraphernalia had been seen by 
the informant in Vigh's presence. Both of the items had been 
seen at Vigh's residence during the last 10 days. 
2. The informant stated that Vigh had been under the 
home of Peon Tucker in Sunset and believed he may have stashed 
something there. The informant further stated that the informant 
believed that Vigh also kept a large amount of money at Tucker's 
residence. 
3. The informant stated that during the last 10 days 
the informant had also observed marijuana in Vigh's presence in 
his vehicle. The vehicle was described as a 1988 Ford Tempo, 
two-door, creme in color, license number 217 EVE. 
4. The informant stated that Vigh was selling a large 
amount of controlled substances sufficient to store house a large 
amount of money which was kept Tucker's residence and that of 
Vigh' s mo the r" wh o 11 ve s. i i i t . 
Affiant went to Pam Tucker's residence located at 
261 West 1425 North, Sunset and conducted a search of that 
residence. r 
pounds of marijuana underneath the home in a crawl space. 
Affiant also located a large amount of money totalling 
appro 
Affiant spoke with Detective Dave Nance who stated 
that he went the Clearfield Trailer Park and observed IL to be 
J ocat .ed : j He stated he looked at #66 and 
observec to be a single wide mobile home, beige i n col or with 
brown trim. Affiant spoke with personnel, at CI earfie] d Po3 ice 
Department who stated that the manager of Clearfield Trailer Park 
indicated that Dennis Vigh lived at that address. 
? Ji f f i A 111 i' i, 1111111 I iiiM I l\». Lij11 i (i J I 111 6 p a t c 11 fi n J w o s 
informed that Vigh has a 1989 Ford with license 217 EVE, vin 
#1FAPP31X7KK103453 registered to him. 
8. M I i.an! obtained a criminal history on Vigh which 
showed that Vigh was convicted on June 2, 1986 of Arranging for 
the Sale of a Controlled Substances a third degree felony and 
ibution of a Controlled Substance, a third degree 
felony. Affiant observed a search warrant in that case, a copy 
which is attached and made A part a! thlfc affida 
also noted that Vigh was charged with Possession of Cocaine in 
March, 1990. The records of the Davis County Attorneys Office 
shov aisposed of by diversion. The 
criminal record also showed that Vigh was charged with possession 
of controlled substances in 1980 and 1983. 
9. Affiant believes that based upon affiant's 
independent investigation, the information supplied by the 
informant is accurate. Affiant further believes that the 
information is reliable based upon the fact that the informant 
has come forward as a citizen and is not receiving any 
remuneration for the information provided. 
10. Affiant has been involved in the investigation of 
controlled substance violations for over one year and during that 
time has been involved in numerous searches of residences 
involving individuals who sell controlled substances. In each of 
those instances, drug paraphernalia has been located. Affiant is 
also aware from experience and courses attended on the 
investigation of such offenses, that individuals who sell 
controlled substances often maintain records of such sales in 
their residences. 
WHEREFORE, affiant prays that a Search Warrant be 
issued for the search of the above-described premises and vehicle 
and the seizure of the items being searched for. 
Affiant 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 
June, 1992. 
Circuit Court Judge 
LOREN D. MARTIN 
Davis County Attorney 
Courthouse 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Telephone: 451-3227 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
In Re: Search of the 
premises described as 
450 South 546 East, Apt. C, 
Clearfield, Utah. 
SEARCH WARRANT 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) ss: 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE COUNTY OF DAVIS: 
Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me by 
Kent Lewis, Davis County Metro Narcotic Strike Force, that he has 
reason to believe that in the below-described premises there are 
items which constitute evidence of the commission, of a crime. 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED in the daytime^to sake 
*'^/J1|^ »^• milt &A 
immediate search^of the premises described as: 
450 South 546 East, Apt. C, 
Clearfield, Utah, 
and search for the following property: 
Marijuana, 
Paraphernalia associated with the use or 
packaging of marijuana, 
Mushrooms, 
Chemical psilocyn. 
And if you find the same or any part thereof to bring it 
forthwith before me at the Circuit Court
 # County of Davis, or 
retain such property in your custody subject to the order of this 
Court. 
Given under my hand and dated this /2. day of December, 
1985. 
Circuit Court Judge 
LDREN D. MARTIN 
Davis County Attorney 
Courthouse 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Telephone: 451-3227 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
In Re: Search of the 
premises described as 
450 South 546 East, Apt.C, 
Clearfield, Utah. 
AFFIDAVIT FOR 
SEARCH WARRANT 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) ss: 
Before K. Roger Bean, Circuit Court Judge, an officer 
having power to issue a warrant for the arrest of a person 
charged with a public offense, the undersigned, being first duly 
sworn, deposes and says that he has probable cause to believe 
that on the premises which are described as: 
450 South 546 East Apt C 
Clearfield, Utah, 
there is now certain property described as: 
Marijuana, 
Paraphernalia associated with the use or 
packaging of atarijuana, 
Mushrooms, 
Chemical psilocyn. 
The facts to establish the issuance of this warrant are 
as follows: 
1. On September 19, 1985f Agent Paul Rapp of the Davis 
County Metro Narcotics Strike Force purchased marijuana from 
Dennis Vigh. 
2. On September 24, 1985, Agent Rapp purchased psilocyn 
mushrooms from Dennis Vigh. 
3. A confidential informant told Brian Wallace, Clinton 
Police Department, that Dennis Vigh was selling marijuana from 
his residence at 450 South 546 East, Apt C., Clinton, Utah. 
4. A different confidential informant told Steve Hill, 
Clearfield Police Department, that he or she, the informant, was 
a resident of Townhouse Apartments which is the complex of the 
above listed apartment, and that he had seen many persons coming 
and going from the apartment at all hours of the night and day 
and that the informant had witnessed exchanges at the door. Such 
a pattern of traffic is typical of that where drugs are being 
sold. 
5. A third confidential informant told Detective William 
Holthaus of Clearfield Police Department that he had been in the 
above-described apartment and had seen a dresser drawer filled 
with marijuana on October 21, 1985. 
6. A fourth confidential informant advised Agent Rapp 
and Agent Allen Larsen of the State Narcotics and Liquor Law 
Enforcement Bureau, that Dennis Vigh sells marijuana from the 
above-described location and this informant introduced Agent Rapp 
to Vigh for the purpose of making the buys mentioned in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 herein. The information from this informant 
is therefore considered reliable. 
7. your affiant is supervisory agent of the Davis County 
Metro Narcotics Strike Force and in that capacity received the 
information outlined herein from the agents and officers named. 
WHEREFORE, affiant prays that a search warrant be issued 
for the search of the above-described premises and the seizure of 
any of the said items. 
Ss)f<.f«-Ti 
Affiant 
Subscribed and sworn to me this />- day of December, 1985. 
Circuit Court Judge 
STATE OF UTAH ) ^ J ^ R N
 0F SEARCH WARRANT 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
I hereby certify, and return, that by virtue of the within 
Search Warrant to me directed, I have searched for the goods and 
chattels therein named, at the place therein described: (Strike 
either (1) or (2), whichever is inapplicable) 
(1) and that I have such goods and chattels before the Court, 
described as follows: 
tot 
^Jfl) ar 
and that I have been unable to find such goods and chattels, 
I, \To/Ai/ rt.L'/£fi&C/', the officer by whom this War-
rant was executed, do swear that the above inventory contains a true 
and detailed account of all the property taken by me on the Warrant 
19 
Office xl/kt 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this I3 day of JJt<^- t 
Judge 
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MELVIN C. WILSON 
Davis County Attorney 
800 West State Street 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Telephone: 451-4300 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CLEARFIELD DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, t 
In Re: Search of the mobile home: SEARCH WARRANT 
located at 442 South State, #66, 
Clearfield, a single wide trailer: 
beige in color with dark brown 
trim, occupied by Dennis Richard : 
Vigh and the vehicle described 
as a 1989 Ford Tempo, license : 
#217 EVE, vin #1FAPP31X7KK103453, 
registered to Dennis Vigh. t 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) ss. 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE COUNTY OF DAVIS: 
Proof by Affidavit having this day been made before me 
by Gary Haws, Davis Metro Narcotics Strike Force, that there is 
probable cause to believe that in the below-described premises 
and vehicle there is property or evidence which: 
(1) Was unlawfully acquired and is unlawfully 
possessed. 
(2) Is evidence of the crime of possession of 
controlled substances. 
YOU ARE THEREFORE AUTHORIZED AND ORDERED to search the 
premises and vehicle described as: 
The mobile home located at 442 South State, #66, 
Clearfield, Utah, a single wide trailer beige in 
color with dark brown trim, occupied by Dennis 
Richard Vigh; and a 1989 Ford Tempo, license 
number 217 EVE, vin #1FAPP31X7KK103453, registered 
to Dennis Richard Vigh. 
and search for the following property or evidences 
Controlled substances including marijuana and cocaine 
Items of drug paraphernalia 
Documents evidencing the sale of controlled substances 
Documents evidencing the ownership and occupancy of the 
residence 
Money 
If the same or any part thereof is discovered and seized, it may 
be brought before the magistrate or retained in police custody 
subject to further court order. 
This Warrant shall be served in the daytime, and must 
be served within ten days from the date of issuance. 
Given under my hand and dated this day of June, 
1992. 
Circuit Court Judge 
ADDENDUM B 
FILED IN CLERK'S OrriCH 
Auc25 3 5S An '92 
CLErr .2 
BY. 
^•: •on-
AJ> 
CounTr/ £TfiiT£ Of.MTflH _ 
Vi£ STAT*_i>r_UT/iy_. 
V. L. fl+nT*'ff. 
O&fcry dxift 
S f V f g A r t f f MoTl t tA l f f t lMOVgRY 
MoTioNj QltL Of PAftTlCuLARSj 
/WOTlQfM IN L I M I N E j SUPPftESION 
fflOTfOfth' MQTlOni To ftl*KM*5j 
MtfTtQfV TQ BEfrlVEfV AttfMATI 
TtMf Td fLffiMlT M&TldnKj u^i'tK fcUg 
PgTiTlor\l foft MOTION! HfARlMfr o."^ 
loftftSR foft RgCaftQ TRANSCRIPTS: 
a. Sq/tc<±.x\ci ©f fk€$c Two (V) c^seSj fo<* CL C'^ cov^ery o^  .WtK 
Cxic$j fcr OL G«JJ o-f _Po.rT.cMla«*$ ^0c 4oTk C^5c5j for a. rvy0t»'o* 
/n liJiWne / *< totK CQ-seiXto {r\Surc "fAliC* Vt'l)) j for a. S*«fffc£« 
S»otvit cf 5tQtrcK u J o / f a ^ T fc^A. q j ) frM^S o f ) j To dLiVrv>.V5 many 
o* T^g. g k a j j e ^ f t i s Tkey skoulcU'f Kcv/e ^ g ^ tcMC^_ o/CC/J To 
fy.o^Jl To <t»icld$e
-
aJi_tvrflU^e^ Pol»Vc report*./'*^ &«/*&_ 
.^My.all jv/to.c$ie5y (exPcLcaHy JtkoJte. *dhichj*/*M Ttsttyf.&niL 
To ^/sctae f^ t KMA£$*eS TK^T w / i j T^t«f" / ) ; £*1"##'\j 
To aJ low T\sC ic - fe^do-nT <ui£0uatc TtV>c To S u l m T 
o,ffc«^teci o-h t'n<xi£c|ua,Tc _culV''*ory u/ko, ,dUe* OiQT 
KOA/C r*y Lest I'nTgrgST* in _JT\JVJ±. <j.ndL W * trokc* 
• m 
Ui^ Vgr&oJ Pror^i^g *& u / f / f£ <rn<L i u l * * n + _ f y w r e q u e s t 
a*ifO£»'dijp.n To ut/»+: ^/icr<t Cevyft'Aji*\\(oJi*y. <LndL S&*>uJ(L 
cxrtjw w«i ) require rAo,v^y rvictt'or^^ -to iV* $ure VAiR 
t r / c l f o^<L ^Ta/Te$ _. .__ . _ _ 
». TkoTt" fUfendA^Ti fti^M* -to CLVAJV*-KMSJ fequ-Ve^ 
a Severance. 
- TK^-T f h t t w o C'VcuiV Co^r t CaS€5 NO. <)ZI00OS?4,<S. 
av>i <?Z/-£Hg uutft S c h e ^ k i . for frcltV. -. i-€i.r - * j 
. o i^ <*•>* a.f-^r ^u^T^er <xni. s\ftfc &ov*dl 6\/C^ 
or>e r-'+t oftec___*Se _ot Ke r _,_j/t\_£ov**CKov^f a*. xo-Sc 
u/ja.S 4oumL _oVfi.C.._?V\fceti*/e*n defend <^nf 5 (MO- ^ 17003*8 
hfr £0b*e£; No, 91000331 an<L_SH7CoJM• 
ik|TPng *s Pull a- JL>Vly 4r*Vk or>__h»ki*_ 
ifc- OfftrovrsrjyioTjoN 
I. ThoLT <i.t/cndLou>nrt requ>>eS a, d^co^ery Q/ All Tkc t V ' * ^ +WaT 
^ 4 to te v«Si^ «'n K'i Tr/aJjf t'r\ Qfd.tr tc oucU^uateJy f«f^r; 
for .K'S Tr«'al$» 
x. Thai" fUc discovery Ts f 0 iTitluJLt b^ *1" r ^ tfi hVMm'tcdL 
,!ttt.. .v)j ALL EVIDENCE T« U ugjL 
QfTHf UNfTfO STAtf^ ^ l AfM^ND*v£NT tx aniL AfAttEMP 
MENT XIVO 
3. TKa,"t 4, kscoVify r*u$+ fed afo-ta+fci, iV* ^t<ora,a<-.vw to i\.**v. 
H I . 6111 of PARTICULARS 
1.7^ 0^ " ^ G«'U o«f ftx,r-t I*6MIO/5 ,5 rc<juiV4^ tb ensure "fMt£ Tr.'oJ /<>r 
r* .Rut* MT. R.cfi 
I. T^at, a- rv^ot'on |V» ItVniVc i*s re^M'Vcd. *to insure defe*Jt~ 
-tKey, Sfelfc a n d / o r <U*endLcu>t UoA/<no Pr^/jo***!./ teev^  cov%-
y»ctqjt*»' 
•-7>.9rl^ ijkh«rO<€ mn$t.ie doffed J (it* wev/tf vC frr^fca^ *f£o u.*. ^ £ > . 
+^c crvo^tmc»^T o f 'a.u/5 fKaT errKer .V*f©se pani'^menTi-for CLCt$ 
AicT Pu '^sWq l^e a.T «rKc fi'me TKC> u/e't Cowirni'ttt.cL.or iVttrtVte ftin.'sV 
-3-
^ V. *uPPR£Sl0N MOTION 
by a n erroneous ou«£ft^Loj/«Tj I t w ^ s gH&ruti,. fy ou foxocJ 
b,*&d<L J u l y (fiojer k. ftca^V 
I . frajf^ h W i u*e«L t k e ^ c t ^Wa.t X t^<^ j t b l ^ e s L ^ l i 
Pf * gent. Su4» to olta»*n seo-rclx uAx,rro-ryt. 
3. T K a t TkgT y .^ la tes r**y R . j k T T O AMl/VQMgNT V , 
<vrtA AMgNOMf^T w j euncL Ar^rtOMgrMTXfV o/ *v»e 
uNtTFO iTATfS CONSTITUTION (see gJIsc x*v *nen^*v*rrr). 
[. T a^ct, cul/ -fr uteS o-f g&vrcU u/o-franT rwuST oJso be SuPfVesCtL* 
;. Thofl* oaouny ptKer tkiVinS ox iLfrfcndA^t* tt^o ("£) case 3 
__. gn l£ t U SnMrt$e<L 
:. Tk4JH- ^ ft.scovery u iT l l reveal to tUe. «lefe^dto.j£T. 
t W f Tri£R£F6ft£ he w/VI ftfiOntftg CL se<on<L SuPPresS^n 
Jhl&CL*^. 
V I . MOTIQH To QI5MISS 
L ThcDf a> m o t > on to A.i3r*nV* tV^S £ul™«VtedL Qvi o r 
aAoifrt Ju»y r*} m i 
TKa f^ in oil<{,tVion t o rfrem/ I'VteJL on o.Uvc StctedL 
m d ^ W S ALLCHAR^C^ MUST 6 f O t f M l g f P en defendant 
EggU(*$f6<L A. fo<tft>nement o* Prel>V»v our\<L wo.* ,kn*edL 
h»* fewest even TUough Th& Pro4*/u«fr,on, t^ cx^  grau t^edL 
AL tostPoryemvnt <i*\cL «f«/<fi<L +« get letter o«f ft>stft*€-
^ 
me*** Of rc-S£Ke<lwleJk„noV*e to cttfend.v-.T witf.'l 
3 . J W JLe-fervJL^v^ uAiSft't g.Wn ItMFOftMATtON f o r 
e«th$r do.se ._un+/l Prel»'*v hardL—ie^un/ ix-ndl on/y gat 
-TKCrn ouster request <'«q -fUern_^<v*nL ^ f t e r /r«*eeu+*on 
Scuf f iV i -ro Copy.„jv»^6h/y>.e\ (see documents crtitf<Mt40)(+i& 
See 7 > / - * ( i ) ( 0 MT. r . C P. 
V I ) . MOTlofll TO QFfrlVgN ADEQUATE T IME TO SUfiMlT 
..|« TKoJt d ^ e r , ^ o-»^ T requ'rtS much t i m e t « Th (V\}\ o«fi 
Wdjaht uP| 0^*0- ^ufcr^'T mot»o*S. 
2. Tho#. dLe-fcndl^tfT fcel«£/eS Mickc^el 0. AfurPKy «'$ fWecuT** 
K.'rvg He Pro^'Vei. JLe-fendl&nT *^o*ny rfviotib** o-n<^ 
iufPl.'cdL f^ te»\e ( o ) , 
3* That «*" .r^oTioni. * M t w * t « < k fcy dCefcniU-*t^ fr0 %c 
J^LU<\**^*L)&J5L) <Loty^  ft-.or To Tr/cl $ko*l«U te hear<t 
Jn-J^rte*cc_ _tv»'*k _jfcu !c i^ffci) M U l - X «P*. 
fe4L(»Ve^  tkat grtVn»'*oJ J>.cfcn^nT fee y>en ofPortMntTV TO freidnT 
«-^VlfC^^4<i_ „?f^T . ^ * . J < ^ e V a ^ J»^1i<lJ^I^-aJOjLjf^yor«4lfc TO. <JU£*St 
a n i foe*o a n \A OePTy of Carrect'Q*^ J H 3 f - X d 3CO (ia"* c.V. 
t ra .H\ o.« vdl kds . to let£ g+rugicrft Sta-n^O-rdi t^o^n •fcrmflJ 
.P)ep-dk~*Vn£ dra^ftdl fey UwyerSj iV c o * ^ Can reason a4>'y 
ft<vA: —?!<*•£*[?§i to___ito.t6 V«-l«'cL C.lo*»Vk OYN w W ^ ^ ii'+»'gd.nrt 
frofier U30J cmtUori ty y confu^on o-f.Je^aJ tKeor«e^ re or 
£yr\?ou* o-yvK_£ers'tt/\c£> ^ n i t t f ^ + ' b n , or j . ' - r . ^ ^ . nhf> /n / / -
i V fry wi'-rb _PJ«<cdt1V1^  r«^u»'f era e tffs .} _tK*i fero^A, rv»v 16^ 
^MCi'ft for C'VWi-)co>ie *ol/ou/gi fke U . ^ . W g m e £ourT <U£~ 
V I I I . PfTlTlflN FOK MoTlpMS MfAftlflfrS 
I. Oe- f«ndant _fleque«t* Tk'S co«f + to Scktdlnle a / c Some, 
XIV QgQfE Fafi ftfcor-0 TEANSCRiPTS 
k_TKo.t_TKc Co r^fr_ rc^r tc r of fV,c _£en?roJ Arra/rMne*\T Court iko.ll 
j fA tn^r i ' i e a-*wL tro^tfm.'t oJI t a f e i c-f Pfcl«VmV»o.ry H ^ o V j 
__C<L6C No. ^I'OOfJ1* F$ _ hejet or\ _Jwly X^ IS^Z. to tV»e Secov^ 
^ # * 
Of*l*MA* 
DENNIS * * t e Pro $c 
- * -
rtfiTiriCATE Of SEE VICE 
SticmcL rl . lsT, CT. 
r^h Oo.tK^ J d _ J ^ y of AM3/ H U - * 
0EANIS R-VJG-^ D 
-7-
ADDENDUM C 
FILED IN C L E R K ' S ' " i C E 
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William K. McGuire #2192 
Davis County Attorney's Office NOV 12 2 10 PH '92 
800 West State Street 
Farmington, Utah 84025 CLERK. IHZ :''". CO'JHT 
Telephone: 451-4300 Jfr 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
DENNIS R, VIGH, : Case Nos. 921700334 & 0336 
Defendant. : Hon. Rodney S. Page, Judge 
A series of motions filed by the Defendant, came on for 
hearing before the above-entitled Court on the 27th day of October, 
1992. The defendant was present and represented by David 
Grindstaff, the State was represented by William K. McGuire. The 
Court heard testimony relative to some of the motions and received 
memoranda from the parties relative to the other motions and the 
Court having considered the testimony and the memoranda, makes the 
following rulings and orders on the motions: 
MOTION TO SEVER 
The Court has heretofore granted defendant's motion to 
sever trial on the two files charging the defendant with criminal 
offenses. 
MOTION TO DISCOVER 
The defendant requested copies of all police reports in 
both cases as well as witnesses to be called in each. Pursuant to 
O0IG059V 
the answer of the plaintiff, it appears that all police reports and 
witnesses have been submitted to the defendant and this request has 
been complied with fully by the State of Utah. 
Defendant requested disclosure of the confidential 
informant in Case No. 921700334 and testimony was taken relative to 
the necessity of disclosure of the confidential informant. Based 
upon such testimony, the Court enters the following: 
Findings of Facts 
1. The confidential informant provided Detective Gary 
Haws of the Davis Metro Narcotics Strike Force with certain 
information about the defendant including his place of residence, 
his use and possession of controlled substances, his vehicle and 
his criminal background. 
2. The informant provided the detective with information 
that drugs were being stored at the residence of Pam Tucker along 
with a large amount of cash. 
3. Detective Haws went to the residence of Pam Tucker 
and located approximately 6 pounds of marijuana and $12,000 in cash 
consistent with the information provided by the informant. 
4. Detective Haws was able to confirm the information 
relative to defendant's residence, vehicle and criminal background 
as provided by the informant. 
5. The informant received no remuneration for any of the 
information given to Detective Haws. 
The Court having entered its findings of fact, now makes 
the following: 
00160598 
Conclusions of Law 
1. There was no substantial preliminary showing that 
uetective Haws intentionally or knowingly or with reckless 
disregard for truth, falsely swore relative to any information 
received from the informant• 
2. That probable cause existed for the issuance of the 
search warrant based upon the information provided by the informant 
and verified by Detective Haws. 
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law hereby Orders that pursuant to Rule 505 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence, the identity of the informant should not be 
disclosed. 
BILL OF PARTICULARS 
Defendant's request for a bill of particulars was 
sufficiently answered by the State of Utah. 
MOTION IN LIMINE 
Defendant requests that language concerning the 
enhancement due to a prior conviction not be mentioned at trial nor 
i 
be read at trial and that the enhancement be dropped from the 
language of the charge. The Court hereby orders that a bifurcated 
proceeding should be followed in the trial of the case wherein the 
enhancement language relative to the prior conviction shall not be 
read to the jury as a part of the charge nor shall it be referred 
to during the trial of the underlying charge. In the event that 
the defendant is convicted of the underlying offense, the 
determination of a prior conviction shall then be presented for 
enhancement purposes. The Court further Orders that the 
00160599 
enhancement is not violative of the ex post facto provisions of the 
United States Constitution, but that the prior conviction merely 
enhances a subsequent act to make it more serious than it would 
otherwise be had the individual not been convicted. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
The Court heard testimony relative to defendant's motion 
to suppress and based upon such testimony enters the following 
Findings of Fact. 
Findings of Facts 
1. The confidential informant provided Detective Gary 
Haws of the Davis Metro Narcotics Strike Force with certain 
information about the defendant including his place of residence, 
his use and possession of controlled substances, his vehicle and 
his criminal background. 
2. The informant provided the detective with information 
that drugs were being stored at the residence of Pam Tucker along 
with a large amount of cash. 
3 • Detective Haws went to the residence of Pam Tucker 
and located approximately 6 pounds of marijuana and $12,000 in cash 
consistent with the information provided by the informant. 
4. Detective Haws was able to confirm the information 
relative to defendant's residence, vehicle and criminal background 
as provided by the informant. 
5. The informant received no remuneration for any of the 
information given to Detective Haws. 
The Court having entered its Findings of Facts, now makes 
the following: 
00i60G0G 
Conclusions of Law 
1. That there was probable cause contained in the 
affidavit sufficient for the issuance of a search warrant on 
defendant's residence. 
2. That no showing of bias on the part of the judge or 
of any erroneous information is present* 
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law hereby Orders that defendant's motion to 
suppress is denied. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
The Court has previously ruled on defendant's motion to 
dismiss finding that the bind over of the matters were pursuant to 
sufficient probable cause for the sitting magistrate to bind the 
matters over for trial. The Court has further reviewed the record 
of the proceedings consistent with plaintiff's memorandum and finds 
that there was no error in failing to postpone the preliminary 
hearing at the request of the defendant, nor any problem with the 
defendant being advised of the charges and provided with 
information relative to the charges and therefore% defendant's 
motion to dismiss is denied. 
DATED this R**- day of fl*yg^ I^A^ 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
RODNEY S J PAGE, Jiidge 
00160601 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed an unexecuted copy of the 
foregoing Order on Defendant's Motions, with postage prepaid 
thereon, to David L. Grindstaff, at 395 South 600 East, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84102, this igffi^day of October, 1992. 
Secretary Q 
ADDENDUM B 
r i b E V 
Utah Court of Appeals 
This opinion is subject to revision before flAR 1 5 1994 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
J ^ 4 ^ IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
•/• Mary T. Noonan 
^ f Clerk of the Court 
— — o o O o o — -
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Dennis Richard Vigh, 
Defendant and Appellant* 
Second District, Davis County 
The Honorable Rodney S. Page 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 930204-CA 
F I L E D 
(March 1 5 , 1994) 
Attorneys: Glen T. Cella, Kaysville, for Appellant 
Jan Graham and Marian Decker, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee 
Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Orme. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Dennis Richard Vigh appeals his convictions for possession 
of marijuana with intent to distribute and for possession of 
cocaine, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv), 
(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1993). Because Vigh committed these two 
offenses within 1000 feet of a school, his convictions were 
enhanced to second degree felonies under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(5)(a), (5)(c) (Supp. 1993). Vigh also appeals his conviction 
for possession of marijuana without tax stamps affixed, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 59-19-105, 
(1990). Vigh specifically challenges the trial court's denial of 
his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm. 
FACTS 
On June 16, 1992, Detective Gary Haws of the Davis County 
Metro Narcotics Strike Force sought a search warrant for Vigh#s 
mobile home in Clearfield, Utah. Detective Haws based his 
probable cause affidavit on information from a confidential 
informant and on independent verification of that information. 
The affidavit contained the following information provided 
by a confidential informant. The informant had telephoned 
Detective Haws and reported Vigh was selling marijuana and 
cocaine. The informant provided Vigh's address and descrit 1 
Vigh^s vehicle to Detective Haws. Within the previous ten ays 
the informant had observed marijuana, cocaine, and attendar . drug 
paraphernalia in Vigh's residence as well as marijuana in igh's 
vehicle. The informant was knowledgeable about marijuana oecause 
of prior use. The informant also told Detective Haws tha^ Vigh 
had been in the crawlspace underneath Pam Tucker's house in 
Sunset, Utah. Tucker was Vigh's girlfriend. The informant 
believed that Vigh had stashed drugs and money at Tucker's 
residence. 
Detective Haws, assisted by Detective Dave Nance, confirmed 
the informant's assertion that Vigh resided at the Clearfield 
Trailer Park with a drive-by observation and with the park 
manager. Detective Haws also confirmed the informant's 
description of Vigh's vehicle with Bountiful City Police. 
Detective Haws went to the Tucker residence in Sunset, Utah and 
conducted a consensual search. Detective Haws found three to 
four pounds of marijuana in the crawlspace of the house. 
Detective Haws also found approximately $12,000 in cash in the 
master bedroom. Beyond his personal verification of the 
confidential informant's story, Detective Haws believed the 
information was reliable because the informant had come forward 
voluntarily and had received nothing in exchange for the 
information. 
In addition, Detective Haws obtained Vigh's criminal history 
which showed that Vigh had been convicted of a controlled 
substance offense in 1986. Detective Haws attached the 1985 
search warrant that resulted in Vigh's prior conviction to the 
probable cause affidavit. 
Judge K. Roger Bean of the Layton Circuit Court issued the 
search warrant as requested by Detective Haws's affidavit. 
Detectives arrested Vigh based on the contraband discovered at 
the Tucker residence. Detectives then executed the warrant at 
Vigh's mobile home and seized approximately one pound of 
marijuana as well as baggies, scales, and other drug 
paraphernalia which contained cocaine residue. Vigh's driver's 
license likewise contained cocaine residue. Investigating 
detectives also determined that Vigh's mobile home was located 
within 1000 feet of a school.1 
1. Vigh concedes that Pioneer Adult Rehabilitation Center is a 
"school" under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5) (Supp. 1993). 
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finding of probable cause. The State also asserts that Vigh's 
criminal history was properly included in the affidavit. 
It is well settled that Utah courts employ the "totality-of-
the-circumstances test" articulated in Illinois v. Gates, 4£2 
U.S. 213, 238# 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) zo 
determine the sufficiency of an affidavit supporting a sear_n 
warrant. State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1259-62 (Utah 1993); 
State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 129-30 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 643 (Utah App.)r cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 
(Utah 1993); State v. Purser. 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992). 
Probable cause is determined by a magistrate who 9,make[s] a 
practical common-sense decision whether, given all the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . , including the 
* veracity' and * basis of knowledge', of persons supplying hearsay 
information, there is a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Gates, 
462 U.S. at 238, 103 S. Ct. at 2332 (quoting Jones v. United 
States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S. Ct. 725, 736, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 
(I960)) (emphasis added). 
We do not review a magistrate's probable cause determination 
de novo; rather, we simply decide if the "magistrate had a 
substantial basis for concluding that there were enough facts 
within the affidavit to find that probable cause existed." State 
v, Collard. 810 P.2d 884, 885 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 
327 (Utah 1991). To make that decision, we consider the 
affidavit "in its entirety," State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 
1102 (Utah 1985), and pay great deference to the magistrate's 
determination. Collard, 810 P.2d at 886 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. 
at 236, 103 S. Ct. at 2331). 
The instant affidavit contains ten paragraphs. Nine 
paragraphs recount the confidential informant's information and 
independent police corroboration of that information. Only one 
paragraph recounts Vigh's criminal record. We have held that 
criminal histories are not properly part of probable cause 
determinations because such determinations center only on the 
likelihood that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular 
place. Brooks, 849 P.2d at 644; State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952, 
956 (Utah App. 1993) (concluding fact that local drug agencies 
investigated defendant and fact that defendant's companion was a 
convicted drug user, without more, did not establish probable 
cause). 
Stale information such as prior convictions cannot be the 
sole basis for determining that probable cause exists. See State 
v, Strorcberq, 783 P.2d 54, 56-57 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 
795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). The stale facts in Vigh's case, 
however, were limited to one paragraph and to the attachment of 
the 1985 warrant. Including this information in the affidavit 
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Vigh filed several pro se motions, including a motion to 
suppress evidence seized at the mobile home. The motion to 
suppress alleged that Vigh's prior criminal history was 
improperly included in the affidavit in violation of his Fourth, 
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Vigh retained counsel 
prior to the hearing on his various pro se motions. At that 
hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. Looking 
at the affidavit as a whole, the trial court concluded that it 
offered a substantial basis from which the magistrate could have 
found sufficient probable cause to issue the search warrant. 
At trial, James Gaskill of the Weber State University Crime 
Laboratory testified that a white powdery residue visible on the 
baggies, scales, and Vigh's driver's license was indeed cocaine. 
The residue, however, was not measurable or quantifiable. 
Gaskill further testified that the residue could be consumed but 
that it was likely insufficient to produce a reaction. The 
investigating detectives also testified that Vigh's mobile home 
lay within 1000 feet of a school. The detectives' measurement, 
however, required trespassing across the railroad tracks which 
run between the school and the mobile home park. Detectives also 
climbed through holes in the chain link fence surrounding the 
mobile home park in making the measurement. Having heard this 
testimony, the jury found Vigh guilty on the three charges and 
found that Vigh committed the offenses within 1000 feet of a 
school. Vigh now appeals. 
ISSUES 
Vigh's case presents three issues: (1) whether the 
affidavit sufficiently established probable cause and thus 
whether the trial court properly denied Vigh's motion to 
suppress; (2) whether the cocaine residue was sufficient to 
sustain Vigh's cocaine possession conviction; and (3) whether the 
distance supporting the sentence enhancement should have been 
measured irrespective of physical and legal barriers. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Sufficiency of the Affidavit 
Vigh contends that the trial court improperly denied his 
motion to suppress when it concluded that the affidavit 
established probable cause to issue the warrant that resulted in 
Vigh's conviction. Vigh asserts that, without his prior criminal 
history and the attachment of the 1985 warrant, Detective Haws's 
affidavit is inadequate to establish probable cause. The State 
responds that the affidavit provides a substantial basis for a 
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When examining claims of insufficiency of evidence, we view 
the evidence and its reasonable inferences in the light mc.tr 
favorable to the jury verdict. State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 12, 
345 (Utah 1985); State v, Lemons. 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah op. 
1992), cert, denied. 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). Jury verd: cs are 
reversed only where reasonable minds must have entertainec a 
reasonable doubt that defendants committed the crimes of which 
they were convicted. Lemons. 844 P.2d at 381; State v. Johnson, 
774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989). 
In Utah, ff[t]he determinative test is possession of a 
narcotic drug, and not useability of a narcotic drug." state v. 
Winters. 16 Utah 2d 139, 396 P.2d 872, 875 (1964) (footnote 
omitted). Furthermore, "the key in prosecuting for unlawful 
possession of narcotics is proving that *the accused exercised 
dominion and control over the drug with knowledge of its presence 
and narcotic character.'" State v, Warner. 788 P.2d 1041, 1043 
(Utah App. 1990) (quoting Winters, 396 P.2d at 874). In Warner, 
we held that a white powdery residue of methamphetamine was 
sufficient to support a defendant's conviction for possession 
although the quantity was insufficient to produce a physical 
effect. £&• at 1043-44. We affirmed the possession conviction 
in Warner because the defendant exercised control over the drug 
"with knowledge of its presence and narcotic character." ££. at 
1043. 
Vigh's case is analogous to the circumstances in Warner. 
The cocaine residue was visible on the baggies, scales, and 
Vigh's driver's license; however, it was not measurable or 
quantifiable and was insufficient to produce a physical effect if 
consumed. Nevertheless, police found the residue inside Vigh's 
home in the context of drug paraphernalia and in Vigh's personal 
effects, demonstrating that Vigh both knew of the drug's presence 
and exercised control over it. See State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 
319 (Utah 1985) (holding not only knowledge of drug but also 
intent to exercise control over drug necessary for possession 
conviction). In addition, the context in which police found the 
residue indicates not only possession but also distribution. The 
residue itself is only part of the evidence supporting the 
possession conviction.3 The drug residue must be viewed in the 
context where it is found. See id. 
Because police found the cocaine residue in the context of 
drug paraphernalia over which Vigh exercised dominion, we 
3. We have affirmed a possession conviction where there was no 
physical evidence of the drug but only evidence that the 
defendant had recently smoked marijuana. Provo Citv Corp. v. 
SDQtts. 861 P.2d 437, 442-43 (Utah App. 1993) (following United 
States v. Dolan. 544 F.2d 1219, 1221 (4th Cir. 1976)). 
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may have been improper,/but it was not fatal.2 Excise the stale 
information, and this Affidavit remains viable. With the 
criminal history paragraph deleted and the 1985 warrant removed, 
the remaining information nonetheless demonstrates that "the 
issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that 
there were enough facts within the affidavit to find that 
probable cause existed." Collard, 810 P.2d at 885. 
The remaining facts in the affidavit center on the 
confidential informant's information and on police corroboration 
of that information. In their probable cause determinations, 
magistrates must consider the veracity and reliability of a 
person supplying information to police officers. See Gates. 462 
U.S. at 238, 103 S. Ct. at 2332. "[Reliability and veracity are 
generally assumed when the informant is a citizen who receives 
nothing from the police in exchange for the information." 
Purser. 828 P.2d at 517. Because the confidential informant here 
received nothing in exchange for information about Vigh's illegal 
activities, the magistrate properly assumed that the informant 
was reliable. "Further buttressing reliability is the detail 
with which an informant describes the facts set forth in the 
affidavit and independent corroboration of the significant facts 
by police." Id. Because the confidential informant offered 
significant details such as the cash and drugs hidden at Tucker's 
house and because police independently corroborated those 
details, the magistrate properly determined the confidential 
informant was reliable. 
Viewing the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that 
even with Vigh's criminal record omitted the magistrate had a 
substantial basis for finding probable cause and issuing the 
search warrant. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied 
Vigh's motion to suppress. 
B. Sufficiency of Residue for Possession Conviction 
Vigh also contends the evidence does not support the jury's 
verdict that Vigh was guilty of cocaine possession. Vigh asserts 
that because the cocaine residue was neither measurable nor 
quantifiable he cannot be guilty of possession. The State 
responds that the standard for possession is neither the amount 
nor the useability of the drug but rather a defendant's knowledge 
of the controlled substance's presence. 
2. Vigh relies exclusively on Brooks, 849 P.2d at 644 for his 
contention that including his criminal history proves fatal to 
the affidavit. Vigh does not seem to recognize, however, that we 
concluded the Brooks affidavit was sufficient to establish 
probable cause even with the defendant's criminal history 
omitted. Ifl. at 645. 
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conclude there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that 
Vigh controlled the drug with knowledge of its presence and its 
narcotic character. Accordingly, the jury properly found Vigh 
guilty of cocaine possession. 
C. Measurement of the 1000 Feet Sentence Enhancement 
Vigh finally contends that sentence enhancement should be 
measured not by a straight line but by the most direct non-
trespassory pedestrian route.4 Such a measurement between Vigh's 
mobile home and the school would exceed 1000 feet. The State 
responds that a straight line method of measurement is the only 
one consistent with the legislative purpose of the enhancement 
statute. 
The state legislature enacted the penalty enhancement 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 58*37-8(5), "to protect the public 
health, safety, and welfare of children of Utah from the presumed 
extreme potential danger created when drug transactions occur on 
or near a school ground." State v. Moore. 782 P.2d 497, 503 
(Utah 1989). Therefore, the purpose of the sentence enhancement 
statute is to create a "drug-free zone" around schools and other 
specified structures "to protect children from the influence of 
drug-related activity." State v. Strombera, 783 P.2d 54, 60 
(Utah App. 1989), cert- tenijflf 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). The 
statute itself is silent as to how the 1000 feet should be 
measured; moreover, Utah courts have not yet addressed the 
measurement question. 
Utah patterned its sentence enhancement provision after the 
federal Controlled Substances Penalties Amendment Act of 1984. 
Strombera. 783 P.2d at 59 n.3; see 21 U.S.C.A. § 860(a) (Supp. 
1993). Federal case law thus offers direction as we answer the 
question of how best to effectuate the legislature's purpose when 
measuring the distance for sentence enhancement. In United 
States v. Clavis. 956 F.2d 1079, 1088 (11th Cir.), cert, denied. 
U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 2979 (1992), the court held that "the 
statutory distance must be measured by a straight line method 
4. Vigh characterizes his argument as a sufficiency challenge to 
the jury's finding that his mobile home lay within 1000 feet of a 
school. Vigh concedes, however, that, if the distance supporting 
sentence enhancement is measured by a straight line, the State 
clearly showed his offenses took place within 1000 feet of a 
school. Vigh also concedes that courts have upheld the 
constitutionality of Utah's sentence enhancement statute. State 
v. Moore. 782 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989); State v. Strombera. 783 P.2d 
54, 61 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
Vigh thus raises only the question of how 1000 feet should be 
measured. 
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rather than a pedestrian travel route." Additionally, the court 
opined that " [t]he way to create a definite and identifiable 
[drug-free] zone is by extending radii outward around the 
property on which the school is located.11 J&. Perhaps even more 
persuasive is United States v. Watson. 887 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 
1989) , where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sensibly reasoned 
that f,[s]chool children are not known for taking what adults may 
conclude would be the most appropriate routes to and from school. 
Only a straight line measurement creates a readily ascertainable 
zone of protection.11 Id. at 981. 
For the purpose of sentence enhancement under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-38-8(5), we conclude that 1000 feet should be measured in a 
straight line radius extending outward from the school's or other 
specified structure's property. The 1000 feet should be measured 
irrespective of fences, railroad tracks, walls, streams, 
buildings, roads, and other physical or legal barriers. In 
short, Utah's sentence enhancement is measured "as the crow 
flies." Accordingly, the jury properly found that Vigh committed 
two drug offenses within 1000 feet of a school, and the trial 
court properly enhanced Vigh's sentences. 
CONCLUSION 
The affidavit supporting the search warrant that resulted in 
Vigh's convictions provided a substantial basis for the 
magistrate's finding of probable cause, even with Vigh's criminal 
history excised. The trial court therefore properly denied 
Vigh's motion to suppress. Moreover, the evidence presented at 
trial was sufficient to support the jury's findings that Vigh 
possessed cocaine and that Vigh committed the offenses within 
1000 feet of a school. The jury thus properly found Vigh guilty 
of cocaine possession, and the trial court properly enhanced his 
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sentences. Accordingly, Vigh's convictions and their attendant 
sentence enhancements are affirmed. 
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